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ALTERNATIVE PLEADING: II*
Roy W. McDonaldt
N any save the most elementary of litigation, the practicing lawyer
frequently encounters difficulty in estimating with confidence,
in advance of the trial, what precise fact propositions may be established by the evidence. As a result, he desires to preserve for himself the maximum area in which to maneuver as the testimony unfolds.
One device for assuring such B.exibility is the use of alternative pleading. The present series of articles undertakes to depict the extent to
which the pressure of this common professional experience is reB.ected in our civil practice.
In the prior article we found that in the common law courts by
the beginning of the nineteenth century the traditional requirement
of a single issue was subject to relaxation or evasion by a variety of
procedural techniques. Some of them tended to unnecessary obscurity,
complexity, and expense, and even in the aggregate they had not yet
accorded full freedom of approach to the uncertain litigant. But
more than a mere start had been made in the common law courts along
the path that was to lead to the reforms of the 1870's, and experience
was demonstrating the need for additional progress.
Meantime, .what was happening on the other side of the hall-in
the equity courts?

I

III
EQUITY

Chancery practice, though never hampered by the rigid forms of
action or the single issue requirement which developed at common
law, had its own technicalities. Equity bills were for convenience
classed according to their subject matter and nature, and within the
bill a sequence of artificial subdivisions was well established. Demurrers and pleas and answers had their own difficulties of form
"The fust article appeared in the January issue, 48 Mi:CH. L. R:sv. 311 (1950). A third
article will be published in volume 49.-Ed.
t B.S.C., Southern Methodist University, 1940; LL.B., University of Texas, 1927;
LL.M., Columbia University, 1941. Member of the United States, New York and Texas
Bars. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist, 1938-45; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Texas, 1939; University of Michigan, 1942; Columbia University, 1946. Member of Donovan Leisure Newton Lumbard & Irvine, New York City.-Ed.
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which the practitioner was required to observe. Further, there was
the circumstance, without parallel in the common law, that the same
instruments were called upon to perform the pleading functions of
notice and issue formulation and the evidentiary function of discovery
through interrogatories and answers thereto. Moreover, equity's ambitious willingness, under its policy of avoiding a multiplicity of actions,
to undertake the settlement of controversies of the most complex nature contributed to the complication of its procedure. The system
of procedure which emerged is said to have drawn down this condemnation by John Wesley in 1745:
"I ... saw that foul monster, a Chancery bill. A scroll it was of
42 pages in large folio to tell a story which needed not to have
taken forty lines, and stuffed with such stupid senseless improbable lies, many of them, too, quite foreign to the questions, as I
believe would have cost the compiler his life in any Heathem
Court, either of Greece or Rome.... "1
There was, however, one rule of equity pleading which, above
all others, exercised a pervasive restrictive inHuence upon the use of
alternative contentions. This was the insistence that a party's allegations be consistent, that is, that the several fact propositions alleged
all be capable of co-existing simultaneously. To prohibit a party from
putting forward incompatible factual contentions is, in essence, to
prohibit alternative pleading in situations where it is clearly indicated.
For if one can escape from the historical matrix in which so much of
our procedural thought is confined and think of the problem as an
original question, it will be recognized immediately that the ·occasion
for a pleader's bona fide uncertainty about the facts may very often
rest in his doubt as to which of two contradictory fact propositions
1 Quoted by Augustine Birrell in lecture, Dec. 13, 1900, "Changes in Equity Procedure and Principles," A CENTURY OF LAW REFORM 177 at 182 (1901). L\NGDELL,
EQmTY PLEADING, 2d ed., 53 (1883) notes that in its later history the equity bill "assumed
a very artificial, not to say fantastic, form." See Lord Thurlow's criticism of the practice
by the East India Co. of making "use of the opportunity, arising from their monstrous
property, to very vexatious purposes" by filing excessively lengthy bills. East India Co. v.
Henchman, 1 Ves. Jr. 287, 30 Eng. Rep. 347 (1791). Compare the faint praise of
STORY, EQUITY PLEADING, 10th ed., 19 (1892): ''They have gradually attained a high
degree of exactness and accuracy of statement; and without being positively bound up
in mere technical niceties and subtleties, they have become subjected to many rules of an
artificial, although useful, establishment." As an example of the delay of chancery causes,
see Kensington v. White, 3 Price 164, 146 Eng. Rep. 224 (1816) which involved a prior
litigation in law: the bill was filed in 1802, the defendant put in a deficient answer in
1811 and his first sufficient answer in 1815, the decision was in 1816. See comment of
W. Blake Odgers in A CENTURY OF LAw REFORM 223 (1901): "No lawyer now alive
can conceive what a chancery suit was like in the days of Lord Chancellor Eldon."
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accurately states the fact which existed at the determinative period of
the controversy. At the common law, through separate counts based
on the fiction of separate and distinct controversies, the hampering
requirement of consistency was avoided on the plaintiff's side. Under
the general issue, and later under the Statute of Anne as it developed,
the defendant also was freed ultimately to put forward contradict01y
positions. Only toward the end of the traditional equity practice did
some slight freedom of this sort find its way into the chancery courts.
For all its inefficiencies, difficulties, and delays, the equity practice exercised an influence on procedure in the jurisdictions of the
United States even greater than that of the common law courts. This
was true despite an early resistance to its acceptance, for many of the
colonists, suspicious of a procedure which vested such power in a single
judge, were reluctant to import the practice. In time, however, as their
distrust yielded to a recognition of the values of the more adaptable
remedies available in the equity courts, the procedure was accepted.
Despite the spread of the codes after 1848, procedure on the equity
side of the Federal courts and in the equity suits of a substantial number of states was still, at the end of the nineteenth century, "in its essentials, the same as that which so long prevailed in England, though
... simplified and liberalized."2 Though today the separate equity
docket is retained in but a dwindling number of states, and even in
these the practice has been extensively modified, the chancery background still finds reflection in many American decisions upon points
of practice.

A.

Alternatives in Plaintiff's Bill

In the equity bill the plaintiff set forth his version of the circumstances which gave rise to the controversy. The element of notice
entered, at least theoretically, into the concept of equity pleading, for
the courts required such a degree of certainty that the defendant would
''be distinctly informed of the nature of the case which he [was] called
upon to meet."3 The influence of this element is perceived in the
2 BARTON, SUIT IN EQUITY, Ingersoll ed., 23 (1895). By Fed. Eq. Rule 33 (1822),
the equity practice in the circuit courts, in all cases not covered by rules of the United
States Supreme Court or of the circuit courts, "shall be regulated by the practice of the
high court of chancery in England." By Fed. Eq. Rule 90 (1842), this was continued with
the qualification, "so far as the same may reasonably be applied consistently with the local circumstances and local convenience .•• not as positive rules, but as furnishing just analogies.•••"
By Fed. Eq. Rule 18 (1912), "unless otherwise prescribed by statute or these rules the
technical forms of pleading in equity are abolished."
s Houghton v. Reynolds, 2 Hare 264, 67 Eng. Rep. 110 at 111 (1843).
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attitude toward alternatives presented in three situations of progressive
complexity.
I. The simplest case was that wherein a plaintiff was able to
allege a connected sequence of consistent factual propositions which
might support two or more types of equitable relief, but was uncertain
as to the appropriate relief to be awarded. Here the chancery courts
would permit him to set forth his propositions at length, and to frame
his prayer in the alternative for different types of relief, provided each
type sought was consistent with the case made by the bill. 4
2. More difficult were those cases in which the plaintiff knew
what he wanted, but was not entirely clear as to the precise fact propositions which he could prove to establish his right. Here again the
courts met the situation, though not without important reservations.
A plaintiff who asserted a claim which could be established in one or
the other of two or more ways was permitted to state his propositions
in "a double aspect," that is, in the alternative,5 provided that all were
capable of being true simultaneously,6 and provided "each aspect, or
alternative," entitled the plaintiff to the same relief and was subject
to the same defense. 7 This was recognized as particularly desirable
where the facts were peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge. 8
The plaintiff, of course, could not rest upon the assertion of a right
which was either legal or equitable, since he must show a claim in
equity.9 And the alternatives must not be carried to such an extent
that the bill was so uncertain as to be incomprehensible, for this would
4 LANGDELL, EQmTY PLEADING, 2d ed., 60 (1883). See Rawlings v. Lambert, I
J. & H. 458, 70 Eng. Rep. 826 (1860); Harrell v. Mason, 170 Ala. 282, 54 S. 105 (1911).
Specific performance: alternative award of damages if specific performance not granted:
the alternative relief was allowed in Denton v. Stewart, 1 Cox. 258, 29 Eng. Rep. 1156
(1786), though the bill prayed only for specific performance. Denton v. Stewart was
overruled in Todd v. Gee, 17 Ves. Jr. 273, 34 Eng. Rep. 106 (1810), though the prayer
was in the alternative, on ground that determination of damages was for common law
courts.
5 Owen v. Nodin, 13 Price 478, 147 Eng. Rep. 1054 (1824). See Gibson v. Whitehead, 4 Madd. 241, 56 Eng. Rep. 695 (1819). MITFoRD, PLIW>INGS IN THE CotmTs OF
CHANCERY, Tyler ed., 133 (1890).
6 This rule resulted in a holding of multifariousness in many cases where common sense
would have sustained alternative claims. For example, see Wilkson v. Blackwell, 4 Mo. 428
(1836) seeking specific performance of a contract for land and alleging that the land was
paid for (1) with money, or (2) with hogs.
7 See Gordon's Admr. v. Ross, 63 Ala 363 (1879). Accord: Lehigh Zinc & Iron Co. v.
New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co., (C.C. N.J. 1890) 43 F. 545; Mobile Savings Bank v. Burke,
94 Ala. 125, 10 S. 328 (1891). See SmPMAN, EQmTY PLEADING 333 (1897).
SBaring v. Nash, 1 V. & B. 551, 35 Eng. Rep. 214 (1813).
9 Edwards v. Edwards, Jacob 335, 37 Eng. Rep. 878 (1821).
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violate the requirement of notice. 10 But assuming consistency, notice,
and a single type of relief, alternative statements were allowed.
The results were much the same when the alternative statements
were viewed as evidencing different causes of action. The test of
joinder of causes in equity was whether the joinder made the bill
"multifarious." This question arose in two settings: first, when the
issues involved a single plaintiff and a single defendant (or, if there
were multiple parties, the relationship was such that those on each
side could be treated as a single party); and secondly, when the issues
arose in a controversy involving multiple plaintiffs or multiple defendants, or both, with distinct interests. The latter aspect is primarily
a problem of party joinder, and is excluded by the defined scope of
this study. It may be noted in passing, however, that in neither aspect
was it ever possible to frame a single concise definition of the concept
of "multifariousness."11 For present purposes, the traditional equity
rule of joinder may be summarized as permitting the plaintiff to join
as many consistent equitable claims as grew from the same subject
matter or the same transaction or series of transactions, provided they
led to the same recovery,1 2 and provided that the defendant could
make a single and consistent defense to the whole.13
It has been noted above that freedom to assert incompatible fact
propositions is essential to any liberality of alternative pleading. The
chancery courts came in time to sense this, and shortly before the farreaching reforms of the 1870's inconsistent alternative theories leading
to the same relief were allowed upon an explicit recognition of "how
inconvenient and hard" the opposite result would be.14
10 Ryves v. Ryves, 3 Ves. Jr. 343, 30 Eng. Rep. 1044 (1797); Cresset v. Mitton, 1 Ves.
Jr. 449, 30 Eng. Rep. 431 (1792).
11 STORY, EQUITY PLEADING, 10th ed., 459, 468 (1892); Gaines v. Chew, 2 How.
(43 U.S.) 619 (1844); Campbell v. MacKay, 7 Sim. 564, 58 Eng. Rep. 954 (1836),
1 Myl. & Cr. 603, 40 Eng. Rep. 507 (1836).
12 Atty. Gen. v. Goldsmith's Co., 5 Sim. 670, 58 Eng. Rep. 491 (1834); Mobile Savings
Bank v. Burke, 94 Ala. 125, 10 S. 328 (1891); Johnson v. Benbow, 93 Fla. 124, 111 S.
504 (1927). STORY, EQUITY PLEADING, 10th ed., 259-261, 263 fn (1892); SHIPMAN,
EQUITY PLEADING 339 (1897).
13 Atty. Gen. v. St. John's College, 7 Sim. 241, 58 Eng. Rep. 829 (1835).
14 Foulkes v. Davies, L. R. 7 Eq. 42 (1868): plaintiff sued to cancel deed for incapacity,
praying cancellation and delivery of deed. In a supplemental bill, plaintiff alleged that she
had discovered that the deed contained power of appointment in her, that she had appointed
the property to herself absolutely, prayer that if deed not be void, it be ordered delivered to
her. And see Bagot v. Easton, 7 Ch. D. l (1877), wherein vice chancellor followed what
he understood to be the rule that it was improper to join two inconsistent fact theories,
leading to different relief, and was reversed because of the orders under the Judicature Act
of 1875, but with dictum that the pleading would have been good prior thereto.
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3. The most complex situation arose when the plaintiff desired
to assert incompatible fact propositions leading to different relief. This
type of problem in its most difficult form slides over into questions of
party joinder; for example, where a plaintiff on theory 1 is entitled
to recover against defendant A, or on theory 2 is entitled to recover
against defendant B, theories 1 and 2 being contradictory. This partyjoinder problem is excluded by the defined limitations of the present
study, but in a later footnote there is provided a roadmap for the reader
who may be interested in exploring the route by which the English
courts came at last, in 1921, freely to allow alternative joinder even in
these most difficult factual situations. Equity procedure would not do
so, for even in the one-party type of dispute the general reluctance to
permit the assertion of contradictory positions, even alternatively, prevented the filing of a bill wherein incompatible propositions would
have led to distinct types of alternative relief.15 Thus it was improper
to seek in one aspect of a bill relief upon the theory that a contract was
void, and in another to pray a different relief in the event that, by
failure of proof as to the invalidity, the contract proved to be valid.16
The inconvenience of the rule is evident. At first it was somewhat
alleviated by a liberal policy of allowing amendments at any time prior
to the closing of the pleadings by the plaintiff's replication, and even
thereafter in some situations. But this relief resulted in the multiplication of costs incident to the copying of long and involved bills after
each amendment. The practice of "scraping the defendant's conscience" resulted.17 The plaintiff amended freely, and the defendant
was required to file a new answer and disclosure to each bill. So here,
again, as the period of traditional equity practice drew toward its
close, the courts relaxed the requirement, and recognized the unreasonableness of denying the right to assert both grounds, though the
relief might not be precisely the same.18
15 Thomas v. Hobler, 4 De G. F. & J. 199, 45 Eng. Rep. 1160 (1861). See Pen:y v.
Phelips, 17 Ves. Jr. 173, 34 Eng. Rep. 67 (1810).
16 Cawley v. Poole, 1 H. & M. 50, 71 Eng. Rep. 23 (1863); Rawlings v. Lambert,
1 J. & H. 458, 70 Eng. Rep. 826 (1860); Kendall v. Beckett, 2 Russ. & M. 88, 39 Eng. Rep.
327 (1830); Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. (58 U.S.) 129 (1854); Emans v. Emans, 14
N. J. Eq. 114 (1861). For an example of American statutory modification of this rule, see
Ala. Code (1907) §3095, now Equity Rule 15 (1940), allowing alternative allegations
leading to alternative relief. Smith v. Young, 173 Ala. 190, 55 S. 425 (1911).
17 See A CENTURY op LAw R!!PORM 186 (1901). For the equity rules as to amendment see STORY, EQUITY PLEADING, 10th ed., 747, 755 (1892).
18 Cruikshank v. M'Vicar, 8 Beav. 106, 50 Eng. Rep. 42 (1844), plaintiff allowed to
allege as member of trading partnership, (1) that tea purchased by another member was
so defective as properly to be rejected, with relief accordingly; and (2) if the defect did
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B. Alternative Defenses

In equity the defendant found available four types of response:
the disclaimer, the demurrer, the plea, and the answer. He was not
allowed simultaneously to interpose any two of these to the same part
of the bill: 19 if a demurrer and a plea or an answer overlapped, the
demurrer automatically was overruled;20 if a plea and an answer overlapped, the answer took precedence.21 The defendant might, however, demur to one part of a bill, plead to another, and answer the balance so long as his positions were consistent and did not overlap. 22
The limitation, moreover, applied only to the interposition of these
different contentions in the same pleading. If a demurrer was overruled, the defendant might then file a plea or answer; if a plea was
overruled, he might demur or answer and in the answer might renew
the matter presented in the plea. .With leave of court, he was allowed
to file a more limited demurrer after a broad demurrer had been overruled, or a second plea after the first had been unsuccessful. 23 Thus
it was possible, even within the limitations noted, for the defendant to
fight a delaying action, and in fact to secure the benefit of alternative
contentions which in theory were not allowed.
In so far as alternative factual allegations are concerned, only the
plea and the answer need be considered.
1. The plea. ''[A] plea is of foreign matter [that is, matter not
evident upon the face of the plaintiff's bill] to discharge or stay the
suit."24 It was employed when the defendant had a single affirmative
defense which he believed would dispose of the suit.
not justify rejection, then different relief on ground of false billing for the cost of the tea;
Davies v. Otty, 2 De G. J. & S. 238, 46 Eng. Rep. 366 (1864), plaintiff allowed to allege
(I) conveyance for purported £20 was made without consideration, prayer reconveyance;
and (2) if conveyance was sale, £20 n?t paid, prayer to have sum fixed as lien.
19This rule was modified in England by Order in Chancery 37 (1841); and in the
United States in Fed. Eq. Rule 37 (1842). The modified provision was that "no demurrer
or plea shall be held bad and overruled upon argument only because the answer of the
defendant may extend to some part of the same matter as may be covered by such demurrer
or plea." In the Federal courts, pleas and demurrers were abolished by Fed. Eq. Rule 29
(1912).
.
20P}ea: Dormer v. Fortescue, 2 Atk. 282, 26 Eng. Rep. 573 (1741-2); Jones v. Earl
of Strafford, 3 P. Wms. 79, 24 Eng. Rep. 977 (1730). Answer: STORY, EQarrY PLEADING,
10th ed., 407 (1892).
21 Portarlington v. Soulby, 6 Sim. 356, 58 Eng. Rep. 628 (1833).
22 STORY, EQUITY PLEADING, 10th ed., 407 (1892). The same was true, of course, when
the plaintiff joined more than one cause of action:· the defendant could demur to one claim,
plead to another, and answer another. LANGDELL, EQarrY PLEADING, 2d ed., 115 (1883).
23 Fed. Eq. Rule 20 (1822) prohibited a further plea or demurrer after a plea or demurrer had been overruled, and required answer within two months.
.
24 Ordinances of Lord Bacon, No. 58, quoted BARTON, SmT IN EQUITY 217 (1895).
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The plea owed its importance to the fact that if it was sufficient
on its face it would materially narrow the range of compulsory discovery, and frequently might avoid discovery wholly, on the interrogatories incorporated in the plaintiff's bill. With limited exceptions, and
save for an aberrational period,25 the defendant who answered was
required to answer fully. Even when the plea was employed, the defendant was compelled to answer interrogatories relating to any part
of the bill not reached by the plea; and as to the part covered by the
plea, to answer such interrogatories as would furnish evidence to overcome the plea. 26 But when a plea was sufficient to defeat the plaintiff
even though all the fact propositions in the bill were true, no discovery
was required.
·
The courts conceived the use of a plea to be based upon the resulting saving in time, expense, and trouble; and felt that these advantages would be negatived by the use of multiple pleas. There was,
indeed, no necessity for multiple pleas, since the defendant could assert
the positions in his answer. Accordingly, a plea was limited to a single
point, and a double plea was bad.27 "[N]o more than one defense can
be set up by plea without the special leave of court, and such leave will
not be readily granted." 28 This had a familiar ring: the plea, of all
equity pleading, was most closely analogous to the common law concept of a single issue. The plea might incorporate a variety of factual
propositions, provided they all converged to raise a single point, that is,
a single ground upon which the defendant rested his defense. 29 Inconsistent fact propositions could not do this and hence rendered the
25 For a period, the defendant was not required to answer as to matters which would
be immaterial if he succeeded on the issues made by his answer denying the title of the
plaintiff. The text statement was the original rule, and was reaffirmed in - - - v.
Harrison, 4 Madd. 252, 56 Eng. Rep. 699 (1819). See lLutE, D1scoVERY IN EQUITY,

247-255 (1836).
.
26 Id. at 11. See id. 30-31 for an elaboration of the two types of cases wherein discovery was
required despite a plea: (1) "When the plaintiff in his bill admits the existence of a legal bar,
and charges some equitable circumstances to avoid its effect"; (2) "Where the plaintiff does not
admit the existence of any legal bar, but states some circumstances which may be true, and
to which there may be a valid ground of plea, together with other circumstances which are
inconsistent with the substantial validity of the plea."
27Chapman v. Turner, 1 Atk. 54, 26 Eng. Rep. 36 (1739). MxTFoRD, PLEADINGS IN
THE CounTs OF CHANCERY, Tyler ed., 382 (1890).
28 LANGDELL, EQUITY PLEADING, 2d ed., 108 (1883). The Chancery practice upon
pleas is fully discussed in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 14 Pet. (39 U.S.) 210 (1840).
29 Wood v. Strickland, 2 V. & B. 150, 35 Eng. Rep. 276 (1813); Whitbread v. Brockhurst, 1 Bro. C. C. 404, 28 Eng. Rep. 1205 (1784). STORY, EQUITY PLEADING, 10th ed.,
547 (1892); SmPMAN, EQUITY PLEADING 416 (1897).
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plea defective30 unless they could be disregarded as surplusage.31 As
observed by Lord Brougham, "regard being had to the nature of proceedings in equity and their great and leading objects, among others
that of securing discovery to the Plaintiff, and preventing the Defendant from evading the right to wring his conscience, the strictness of
our rules [as to pleas] is to the full as great on this side of the hall
as on the other."32 It followed, therefore, that there was no provision
for alternative allegations at the plea stage.
Efforts to induce the chancery courts to permit general pleas analogous to those used in common law were unsuccessful, and a plea which
stated the defense in such general terms as not to convey to the opponent notice of the "particular state of circumstances [which] may be
selected by the Defendant as constituting his defense" was insufficient.33
In the later equity practice, some relief was given by allowing the
defendant, with leave of court, to assert pleas that were double. Where
the plaintiff's bill relied upon several matters, the defendant had been
allowed to assert a plea as to each part of the relief sought.34 Now he
was allowed to meet by pleas which were double suits where the plaintiff had alleged his right in the alternative. 35 But the right was not
confined to such cases. Under supervision of the court, such leave
would be granted if, but only if, great inconvenience would result
from a refusal. On such a showing, it was possible to secure leave to
plead two pleas which actually were alternative and inconsistent.36
With the increasing complexity allowed in the plaintiff's bill as the
period of classical equity pleading drew toward its close, confusion as
to double pleas increased. It was noted that even "Lord Redesdale
(that great master of equity pleading) has been under the necessity
so Emmott v. Mitchell, 14 Sim. 432, 60 Eng. Rep. 426 (1845). Nobkissen v. Hastings,
4 Bro. C. C. 253, 29 Eng. Rep. 879 (1793), 2 Ves. Jr. 84, 30 Eng. Rep. 535 (I 793). STORY,'
EQUITY PLEADING, 10th ed., 548 (1892); SmPMAN, EQUITY PLEADING 417 (1897).
81 London v. Liverpool, 3 Anst. 738, 145 Eng. Rep. 1024 (1796); Claridge v. Hoare,
14 Ves. Jr. 59, 33 Eng. Rep. 443 (1807). STORY, EQmTY PLEADING, 10th ed., 547 n (1892).
82 Brougham, L. C., in Hardman v. Ellames, 2 My. & K. 732, 39 Eng. Rep. 1124 at
1128 (1834).
33 Hardman v. Ellames, 5 Sim. 640, 58 Eng. Rep. 480 at 483 (1833), affd. 2 My. & K.
732, 39 Eng. Rep. 1124 (1834); Carleton v. Leighton, 3 Mer. 667, 36 Eng. Rep. 255 (1805).
34 Emmott v. Mitchell, 14 Sim. 432, 60 Eng. Rep. 426 (1845).
sr; Gibson v. Whitehead, 4 Madd. 241, 56 Eng. Rep. 695 (1819).
86 Bampton v. Birchall, 4 Beav. 558, 49 Eng. Rep. 455 (1842); Kay v. Marshall, I
Keen 190, 48 Eng. Rep. 279 (1836). STORY, EQUITY PLEADING, 10th ed., 548 (1892);
SmPMAN, EQUITY PLEADING 417 (1897).
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of much Huctuation on the point,"37 and that "the safest way, and often
the only practicable way to meet a case at all complicated [was] by
answer."38

2. The answer. The defendant's answer in equity had a dual
function. It was, first, a pleading, -setting forth his defenses. It was,
secondly, a statement of answers to interrogatories contained in the
bill, to be considered as evidence. This intermixture of the functions
of pleading and discovery affected the rules applied to the answer. 39
Only the pleading function will be considered here, but it should be
noted that the answers to interrogatories had to be consistent with any
defense which the defendant hoped to maintain.
As to all parts of the bill not successfully challenged by a demurrer
or a plea, the defendant was, through substantially the whole of the
equity period,40 to answer fully. 41 He must specifically "confess, avoid,
deny or traverse all the material parts of the bill."42 The only exceptions to the requirement were made when the admission would violate
a privilege or subject the defendant to a forfeiture, or when the matter
on which an answer was demanded was immaterial.4 3
The requirement that all defenses be consistent made the equity
practice here more strict than that at law. The defendant could interpose as many different defenses as he chose,44 but his answer was
veri:6.ed,45 and this verification was accepted as foreclosing the assertion
87 Ed. note to Whitbread v. Brockhurst, 1 Bro. C. C. 404, 28 Eng. Rep. 1205 at 1212
(1784).
as Id. at 1213.
39 l.ANGDELL, EQUITY PLEADING, 2d ed., 65-66 (1883) points out the "infinite confusion in equity pleading" which resulted from a failure clearly to distinguish the two
functions of the answer.
40 See supra, note 25.
41 This rule was substantially amended by Fed. Eq. Rule 23 (1822), providing that
a defendant, instead of filing a formal demurrer or plea, "may insist on any special matter
in his answer, and have the same benefit thereof as if he had pleaded ••• or demurred."
In the English Order in Chancery 38 (1841), the defendant was authorized in his answer
to decline to answer any interrogatory or part thereof "from answering which he might
have protected himself by demurrer••••" Fed. Eq. Rule 39 (1842), provided that the
rule of full answer should not apply where the defendant "might by plea protect himself
from such answer and discovery,'' and authorized him to raise such matters in his answer.
By rule 44 the defendant was authorized to decline to answer any interrogatory or part
thereof from "which he might have protected himself by demurrer." By Fed. Eq. Rule
29 (1912) pleas and demurrers were abolished, and such matters were required to be raised
by motion to dismiss or in answer.
42 STORY, EQUITY PLEADING, 10th ed., 697 (1892).
43 HARE, DISCOVERY IN EQUITY 262-264 (1836).·
44 SHIPMAN, EQUITY PLEADING 501 (1897).
45 l.ANGDELL, EQUITY PLEADING 87 (1883). There were exceptions to the requirement of an oath, but they need not be reviewed here. The general rule provided the basis
for the prohibition of inconsistencies. The requirement of consistency was eliminated by
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of alternative defenses which could not both simultaneously be true.
It was not enough to swear that "the fact was either in one or the other
of two ways. . . . [T] hen there is in truth no answer at all upon oath....
[S]uch an answer must be bad; for a statement of two or more inconsistent propositions in the alternative is only a mode of making two
inconsistent statements under oath, without incurring the guilt or running the risk of perjury.... [A]ny number would fall within the same
rule; and [if allowed] the whole advantage, if there be any, of a statement on oath by the defendants' answer to the plaintiffs' bill would be
1ost. ..."46
Thus consistent alternatives were permissible, but inconsistent
alternatives were not allowed.

IV
REFORMED PRACTICE

A. Reforms of 1830-1870
The rules which have· been outlined controlled the practice of the
common law and the chancery courts, so far as relevant to alternative
pleading, at the beginning of the nineteenth century. To complete the
story, it is necessary to summarize the changes made during what has
been called " The Period of Benthamism or Individualism," from 1825
to 1870,47 and to note the rules which since 1875 have controlled the
English practice.
The nineteenth century opened with the power of reform vested in
an aristocracy predisposed to rigid conservatism. "Under the horror
excited by the excesses of the French Revolution, the mild and optimistic conservatism of Blackstone mingled, within twenty years after
his death, with that strenuous and almost reactionary toryism of Eldon
which not only retarded but for a time prohibited the removal of
abuses."48 To one conscious of the need of change, the year 1801
Fed. Eq. Rule 30 (1912): "The answer may state as many defenses, in the alternative,
regardless of consistency, as the defendant deems essential .••."
46 Jesus College v. Gibbs, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 145, 157, 160 Eng. Rep. 59 at 64 (1835).
See SmPMAN, EQUITY PLEADING 501 (1897).
47 DICEY, THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 63 (1905). Dicey divided the century into: "I. The
Period of Old Toryism or Legislative Quiescence (1800-1830)," II. Benthamism, and "III.
Period of Collectivism (1865-1900)." Perhaps a better description of the first period is
"the complacent period of procedural despotism," in Sunderland, "Joinder of Actions," 18
MICH. L. REv. 571 at 575 (1920).
48 Dicey, id. at 81.
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hardly could have appeared to be the opening of a century which was
to witness a revolution in the political and social life of England.
An important phase of the general reform movement was the improvement of procedures which came ultimately to fruition in the
1870's. Here our study may move rapidly, touching only upon high
points, for, beginning in 1848 with the New York code, the American
states set out upon an experiment of their own, and the intermediate
English reforms had little influence on that effort. Even the advances
made in England during the 1870's were slow to cross the Atlantic,
and their spread can be observed more pertinently in our later study
of the American practice.
The impulse to change in England came from the accumulating
potency of forces which were beyond the control of conservatism.49
Perhaps the most important was the general dissatisfaction of the public, :finding its voice both in factual accounts in the press and in forceful images in :fiction.50 Though the majority of the bench and bar
opposed the changes almost to the last, some enlightened lawyers
joined the agitation, adding the power of their informed criticism. 51
49 For

a history of the English reforms, see HEPBURN, DEVELOPMENT OP CoDE PLEAD-

ING 67-87, 173-195 (1897); Sunderland, ''The English Struggle for Procedural Reform,"
39 HARv. L. REv. 725 (1926); Fowler, "A Psychological Approach to Procedural Reform,"

43 YALE L. J. 1254, 1257 (1934); A CENTURY OP I.Aw REFORM 177-241 (1901).
50 HEPBURN, DEVELOPMENT OP CoDE PLEADING 70-71 (1897). Urging reform were
the Edinburg Review, founded in 1802; the Westminster Review, founded 1824; the
Illustrated London News, from 1842; the Saturday Review and the London Spectator. Opposed were the Jurist, the Law Magazine, the Law Times, and the Legal Observer. For an
account of the controversy, see Sunderland, ''The English Struggle for Procedural Reform,"
39 HARv. L. REv. 725 at 727-738 (1926). In £ction, examples include DICKENS, PICKWICK PAPERS (1836-1837), BLEAK HousE (1852).
51 Notably Jeremy Bentham. His principal works on procedure were "Draught for the
Organization of Judicial Establishment of France and Comparison with that of National
Assembly" (1790) 4 WoRKs OP BENTHAM, Bowring ed., 285 (1843); "Scotch Reform"
(1808) 5 id. l; parts of "Constitutional Code" (1827-1832) 9 id. l; "Principles of Judicial
Procedure" (published posthumously 1839), 2 id. 5; and RATIONALE OP JUDICIAL EVIDENCE
(1827). See !Lu.EVY, THE GROWTH OP PmLosopmcAL RADICALISM, Morris trans., 373
ff, 509 (1928); DICEY, THE RELATION BETWEEN I.Aw AND Punuc OPINION IN
ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 125-6, 167ff, 204 (1905). "The legal
profession .•• regarded [Bentham] merely as an elderly gentleman full of visionary schemes
which he dimly expounded in very bad English." A CENTURY OP I.Aw REFORM 232 (1901).
See also ANsTEY, THE PLEADERS GumE, 8th ed., 46 (1826) with this comment upon
pleading:
"And thus by ways and means unknown
To all but Heroes of the Gown
A victory full oft is won
Ere battle fairly is begun."
See also Sergeant Hayes, "Crogate's Case: A Dialogue in the Shades," described in PoLLOCK,
GENius op THE CoMMON I.Aw 27-34 (1912); WARREN, TEN THousAND A YEAR (1841);
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At the same time, English scholars and thinkers, inB.uenced by contact with continental jurists, were making their first tentative efforts
to study the substantive content of their law apart from its procedural
setting. 52 Concurrently the industrial revolution and the rapid expansion of trade and commerce confronted the courts with complex
problems which taxed their antiquated machinery. "[A] steadily increasing number of suitors, driven to and fro from law to equity and
equity to law, entangled in a labyrinth of actions, or lost in a wilderness of words, suffered what they felt and knew to be a practical and
substantial injustice. The demand for relief became more and more
urgent, and slowly took form and movement."53 Jeremy Bentham's
attacks upon the profession-to him, "Judge & Co."-for its acquisition
of power and wealth at the expense of litigants, were bearing fruit.
Commissioners were appointed by Parliament in 1828 to investigate the effectiveness of the common law procedure. Unfortunately,
however, the most influential member was Sergeant Stephen, who in
1825 had formulated the first "scientific" elaboration of the principles
of special pleading.54 Strongly inB.uenced by Stephen's views as to the
merits of that system, the commissioners recommended the retention
of the existing practice in substance with minor changes to be made
within its framework. 55
But while the commissioners were still writing reports, reform
began. Against professional resistance it was necessary to make haste .
slowly with a series of small changes. A number of statutes were enacted in the early 1830's,56 including one which introduced the uniPmLLIMoRB, A LETI'ER TO THE LoRD CHANCELLOR ON THE REPoRM OP THE I.Aw, reviewed,
37 LAw MAG. 42, 50ff (1847), also reviewed (second edition), 38 LAW MAG. 85 (1848);
PmLLIMoRB, THOUGHTS ON I.Aw REFORM reviewed 38 I.Aw MAG. 85 (1848).
52 PtucKNETT, CoNCISE HISTORY oP THE CoMMON I.Aw, 3d ed., 339 (1940). See
also McDonald, "The Evaluation of Procedural Techniques," 22 TEMPLE L. Q. 397 (1949).
53 HEPBURN, DEVELOPMENT OP CoDE PLEADING 71 (1897). See also Sunderland,
"Analysis of the [lliinois] Civil Practice Act of 1933," 18 JoNEs, ILL. STAT. 18 (1935);
DrcEY, THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 111-115 (1905).
li4 Holdsworth, "The New Rules of Pleading of the Hilary Term 1834," 1 CAMB. L. J.
261 at 262-263 (1923). Holdsworth traces the genealogy from the publication of the
DoCTRINA PLACITANDI (1677), through CoMYN's DIGEST, Pleading (1762-7); CmTTY,
PLEADING (1817); HALE, HisTORY OP CoMMON I.Aw, Runnington ed., (1820) to STEPHENS,
PRINCIPLES OP PLEADING (1824).
55 SECOND REPORT oP COMMON I.Aw CoMMissxoNERS (1830); Tmnn REPORT OP
CoMMON I.Aw CoMMissroNERs (1831). See 6 I.Aw MAG. 249-348 (1831) for quotation
and discussion of the third report.
56STEPHEN, PLEADING, 5th Am. ed., iii-iv (1845) contains a summary of the acts of the
1830's.
'
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form writ of summons and thus superseded the traditionally diverse
writs suited to the various forms of action. Next caine the Civil Procedure Act of 1833,57 the immediate predecessor of the Hilary Rules
of 1834. Under this act the superior common law courts at Westminster were granted the rule making power and directed to exercise
it within £.ve years.58
The Hilary Rules f9llowed-"a lame and unhappy compromise
... between the conservatism of six centuries and the demand of
modem criticism, of modem convenience."59 The changes made contributed but little of significance to the advance of procedure. The
distinction between the forms of action was reemphasized. 60 The use
of multiple counts and multiple pleas w~ discouraged by a long and
detailed rule purporting to limit each to a distinct and separate subject
matter or defense. By the Rules of Trinity Term in 1831 the common
counts had been somewhat simplified by authorizing those more frequently used to be condensed into a single count in the declaration. 61
The Hilary Rules sought to reverse this policy. They directed that
"where several debts are alleged in indebitatus assumpsit to be due
in respect of several matters ... the statement of each debt is to be
considered as amounting to a several count within the meaning of
the rule which forbids the use of several counts, though one promise
to pay only is alleged in consideration of all the debts." 62 This apparent
limitation, however, was avoided through an interpretation which
allowed any number of considerations for a single debt to be alleged
in one comprehensive count, thereby permitting the plaintiff to protect
himself against the contingencies of proof. 63
57 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 42 (1833).
58 Previously the judges of the Courts

of Kings Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer
had been authorized by 1 Wm. IV, c. 70 (1830) to make rules for the guidance of cases,
over which they had common jurisdiction.
59 HEPBURN, DEVELOPMENT OF Con:s PLEADING 77 (1897). See KmGWIN, CASES ON
CoMMON LAw PLEADING, 2d ed., 500 (1934): "The Hilary Rules as a body have never
been adopted in any of the United States; but certain particular changes in practice, following
the English prescriptions, are made .•• in some of the States, and in two or three jurisdictions
the courts •.• have treated some features ••• as in force."
GO PLUCKNETI', CoNCISE HISTORY OF Tm! Cm,iMON LAw, 3d ed., 368-369 (1940).
61 STEPHEN, PLEADING, 3d ed., appx. lxvii-lxxxii (1835) quotes at length the rule dealing with multiple counts and pleas. Certain minor exceptions were made to the general prohibition. A SECOND REPORT OF CoMMoN LAw CoMMISSIONERS 34 (1830) recommended
that plaintiff be limited to one count on each separate cause of action. The THIRD REPORT
51-53 (1831) recognized the necessity, in certain instances, of permitting the plaintiff in such
a count to plead limited alternatives and recover on the one proved.
~2 Rule 5, STEPHEN, PLEADING, 3d ed., appx. lxxix (1835).
63 Morse v. James, 3 Dowl. N. S. 240, 32 LAW MAG. 213 (1844); Galway v. Rose, 6
M. & W. 291, 151 Eng. Rep. 419 (1840).
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The Hilary Rules also affected the defendant's pleadings. The
various general issues were restricted in their reach, so that each would
raise only certain fact issues. 64 The result was to encourage the use
of multiple pleas to state alternative defenses, since positions formerly
available under the general issues were now required to be alleged
specially. "The failure of the Hilary Rules ... lay in their insistence
on special pleading as it was understood late in the eighteenth century.
Unfortunately, the result of the rules was to extend the necessity of
conforming to that system to a great many cases which theretofore had
not been encumbered with it." 65
During the nearly two decades in which the common law courts
operated under the Hilary Rules, the principal problems of pleading
turned upon the interpretation of the rules relating to common counts,
multiple counts, and the general issues. Dissatisfaction continued
unabated, and in 1852 another effort was made. The New York Code
of 1848 undoubtedly was influential in this new effort,66 but public
dissatisfaction was equally important. 67 Moreover, the lawyers themselves, worn by the continual erosion of small reforms, began by 1850
to lend an active professional hand to the proceedings. Commissioners
were again appointed in 1850, and their reports68 brought action in
1852.
64 STEPHEN, PLEADING, 5th Am. ed., 155-157 (1845); STEPHEN, PLEADING, 3d ed.,
appx. at lvi-bc (1835) quotes "the important rules of Hil. T. 4 W. by which the effect of
the general issue, in each action is ••• determined." The commissioners commented "that the
present ••. practice ••• requires alteration seems to be universally felt; but with.respect to•
the kind of alteration required, the views taken by different persons are surprisingly dissimilar." Id. bci. See SHIPMAN, COMMON LAw PLEADING, 3d ed., 334 (1923).
65 PLUCKNB'IT, CoNCISB IhsTORY oF THB CoMMON LAw, 3d ed., 368-369 (1940).
66 "The New Code of Procedure of New York (1851)" 45 LAw MAG. 1 (1851) ~eviews
the New York code, as explained by David Dudley Field at the Law Amendment Society,
London, Nov. 17, 1850. Following Field's address the society "requesting the American
Minister in London to obtain from some of the leading merchants and lawyers of the State of
New York answers" to a number of questions, not the least significant of which was the last
one: ''Whether professional incomes are lessened by [the code]?" Id. at 15. Replies to the
inquiries are quoted, id. 229-231. A typical provincial attitude toward the importation of ideas
from the wilds of America is illustrated in an anonymous letter dated Sept. 25, 1851 in 46
LAw 1\1.AG. 309 (1851). The Law Amendment Society subsequently made recommendations
for drastic reform. "Fusion of Law & Equity," 47 LAw MAG. 82-89 (1852). See also the
[Ninth] Annual Report of the Law Amendment Soc. (1852), 48 op. cit., 130 (1851).
67W1sn, THB COMMON LAw PnocBDURB Ac:r xvii (1852).
68 These reports are summarized in the Law Magazine. See "First Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners ••• in the Superior Courts of Common Law Uune 30, 1851]," 46 LAw
MAG. 121-140 (1851); ''First Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners ••• in the Court of
Chancery Uan. 27, 1852]," 47 LAw MAG. 206-228 (1852). The commisison continued its
study for nine years. See ''The Common Law Commission [Second Report]," 50 LAw MAG.
110 (1853). "Jurisdiction and Procedure of Courts of Law and Equity [Third Report]," 9
LAw MAG. (2d ser.) 147 (1860).
·
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By the Common Law Procedure Act of 185269 the forms of action
were in effect, though not expressly, abolished; the plaintiff was authorized, except in ejectment or replevin, to join "causes of action, of whatever kind, provided they be by and against the same parties and in
the same rights"; the use of several counts was permitted to the plaintiff; the defendant was authorized to plead a number of enumerated
defenses without £.rst securing leave of court; by leave other defenses
could be interposed on a sworn application showing their necessity;70
the plaintiff in his replication, by similar leave, and either party in
subsequent pleadings could interpose multiple pleas; and other reforms
were introduced. The importance of those summarized to any liberal
application of alternative pleading should by this time be self evident.
The act of 1852 was confused and illogical,71 and was soon supplanted,
but it was a step in the right direction.
The Common Law Procedure Act of 185472 had as its principal
importance a contribution to the movement for the fusion of law
and equity. Shortly before, the Chancery Act of 185273 had authorized the courts of equity to decide all points without the necessity of
certifying to the common law courts questions of law or fact. Now the
common law courts were empowered to issue interlocutory injunctions,
the defendant (or plaintiff in replevin) was permitted to plead equitable defenses in a common law action, the plaintiff was allowed to
plead equitable grounds in a replication, and the common law court
was empowered to decree specific restitution. 74 Substantial progress
might have been made under this act had the lawyers and judges taken
full advantages of their provisions. 75 •
69 15 & 16 Viet., c. 76 (1852).
70 This requirement of an affidavit

led to some confusion. See Lumley v. Gye, 22 L. J.
(n.s.) 463 (1853); Plattv. Else, 22 L. J. (n.s.) 192 (1853). Cf. Price v. Hewett, 17 Jur. 4,
(1853).
71 WISE, THE COMMON LAw PROCEDURE Acrr, quoted in "The Common Law Procedure Act," 48 LAw MAG. 290 (1852). The article in the Law Magazine directs its principal
criticism at the liberal provision for joinder of actions.
7217 & 18 Viet., c. 125 (1854). See "The New Procedure Act," 52 LAW MAG. 121141 (1854), for an adverse criticism of this act. Its attitude may be indicated by one quotation (p. 123): ''But parties to suits ••. are only frgaments of the 'ignoble vulgus,' specially
created to bore judges with heavy business and to make their offices troublesome. • ••"
73 Stat. 15 & 16 Viet., c. 86 (1852). See 48 LAW MAG. 101-117 (1852) for a comment
on the changes in the method of taking evidence in Chancery, brought about by this act.
74 The Second Report of Common Law Commissioners, prior to the passage of the
Common Law Procedure Act of 1854, recommended that virtually all powers of relief existing
in equity be vested in the common law courts, but the act did not carry out this recommendation. See HOLLAND & CHANDLEss, COMMON LAW PROCEDURE Acrr OF 1854, 157-158 (1854).
75 DrcEY, THE RELATION BETWEEN LAw AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 367 (1905): "There are certainly judicious lawyers who have
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It was now but a matter of time before fusion of the law and equity
courts would be accomplished. In 1858 the Court of Chancery was
authorized to try fact questions before a jury, and to allow damages
in connection with its jurisdiction to issue injunctions or compel specific performance.76 The trend was further evident in the Chancery
Act of 1862, which extended the power of equity to determine in any
cause within its jurisdiction every issue of law or fact essential to disposition of the action even though the issue otherwise would be cognizable in a common law court. 77
Thus, for thirty years, the English practice tended toward full
liberality in the allowance of free alternative pleading and toward the
fusion of law and equity. But the full implications of these principles
did not become evident until the rules which followed the Judicature
Act of 1873. Writers in the early years of the 1870's viewed the impending changes with varying emotions. 78 But doubt could no longer
delay reform. In 1869 commissioners were appointed to recommend
further procedural changes. In 1873 the first of the Supreme Court
of Judicature Acts79 created a single group of courts to administer law
and equity, eliminated the formal rules of common law pleadings, and
placed in the judges the power to make rules of pleading subject to
a Parliamentary veto. In 1874 the Supreme Court of Judicature Commencement Act:8° delayed the effective date of the reforms, and in the
following year the Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 187581 supplemented the earlier acts and brought into effect the :first Schedule
of Rules.
B.

Modern English Practice

The orders of 1876 have been amended, and the present orders
are cited as the Rules of the Supreme Court for 1883, but the basic
theory has remained unchanged: to leave largely to the discretion of
the trial court the control of the joinder of causes of action and of
parties, and to allow such freedom of alternative pleading that the
parties may put all their points of dispute before the court, subject to
thought that, if the Common Law Courts had given more complete effect to certain provisions
of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, part of the reforms introduced by the Judicature
Act, 1873, might have been anticipated by nearly twenty years."
21 & 22 Viet., c. 27 (1858).
25 & 26 Viet., c. 42 (1862).
78 See MABxnY, ELEMENTS oF LAW, 3d ed., 424-425 (1878).
79 36 & 37 Viet., c. 66 (1873).
so 37 & 38 Viet., c. 83 (1874).
Bl 38 & 39 Viet., c. 77 (1875).
76

77
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the court's power to order separate hearings or trials where that seems
advisable. Though there were between 1892 and 1935 no less than
seven commissions or committees appointed to review the various
phases of the practice,82 this principle has never been seriously chal_lenged.
Under these orders, as amended, the English practice has achieved
great Hexibility. A plaintiff asserting a claim against a defendant may
plead his factual propositions in the alternative, even though they be
inconsistent, provided that his pleading gives reasonable notice of the
content of each theory. 83 The orders ·specifically recognize the right to
plead two or more inconsistent fact situations and ask for alternative
relief. 84 Even in the divorce court, though the occasion for them is
relatively rare and the requirement of verification has been construed
to limit the alternatives to fact theories which are not incompatible,
alternative allegations have been allowed.85 On a default judgment
in a cause wherein the plaintiff seeks alternative relief, he may have
judgment for the alternative he selects, provided his allegations support such relief.86 With this free authorization of alternatives, the
use of distinct counts to anticipate various developments of the same
claim is no longer necessary. "[GJreat particularity in pleadings ...
is [required] no longer, but the pleadings must contain certain fair and
proper notice of the issues intended to be raised ... to prevent ...
surprise." 87
The plaintiff was afforded an equal latitude in the joinder of separate causes of action. He was allowed to "unite in the same action
~everal causes of action," without any limitations,88 other than that
implicit in the requirement that his pleading be comprehensible: "if
alternative cases are alleged, the facts ought not to be mixed up, leaving the defendant to pick out the facts applicable to each case."89 He
was permitted to "state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims,
either simply or in the alternative."90
82 See Report of Royal Commissioners on the Despatch of Business at Common Law 10
(1934-1936).
83 Philipps v. Philipps, 4 Q.B.D. 127 (1878).
84 Order 19, Rule 24.
85 See 81 SouCITons' J. 428 (1937) citing Thomas v. Thomas (1932) and Shilvock
v. Shilvock (1937), unreported.
·
86 Order 20, Rule 6. See AmrnAL PRAcncB 399 (1946-1947) for citations.
87 Palmer v. Guadagni, [1906] 2 Ch. 4~4, 75 L.J. Ch. 721, 95 L. T. 258.
88 Order 17 (1875), now 0. 18, Rule I.
89 Davy v. Garrett, 7 Ch. D. 473 at 489 (1878).
90 Order 20, Rule 6.
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Similar freedom in the assertion of multiple defensive pleas was
allowed. The new orders removed entirely the requirement for leave
of court in connection with the assi;rtion of multiple pleas by the defendant. 91 The plaintiff, in answering a counterclaim, was free to
interpose multiple pleas to the same degree. 92 The use of the general
issues had been limited in the course of the reforms, and now the
defendant was required either to deny specifically all allegations (except those of damages) 93 or to allege why he could not make such a
denial. 94 Thus the defendant lost the privilege of the general issue
as a cover for alternative contentions, but was given a greater freedom
to assert frankly his alternative positions. He was allowed
"to rely upon one set of facts, if he can succeed in proving them,
and ... upon another set of facts if he can succeed in proving them;·
and it ( would be) far too strict ... to say that he must make up his
mind on which particular line he will put his case, when perhaps
he is very much in the dark. ... At the trial he will rely upon such
of them as he can prove or as may come out in the evidence."95
Thus the English practice, within the field to which we have confined this study, achieved substantially the maximum of B.exibility.
The optimism of the period went, perhaps, beyond the justification
of fact: witness Lord Bowen's enthusiastic declaration: "It may be
asserted without fear of contradiction that it is not possible in the
year 1887 for an honest litigant in Her Majesty's Supreme Court to
91 Order 20, Rule 7. Berdan v. Greenwood, 3 Ex. D. 251 (1878), 20 Ch. D. 764 (1880);
In re Morgan, Owen v. Morgan, 35 Ch. D. 492 (1887), 39 Ch. D. 316 (1888); Hawkesley

v. Bradshaw, 5 Q.B.D. 302 (1880).
92 In Re Smith, Riggs v. Hughes, 9 P.D. 68 (1884) wherein plaintiff sought to probate
a will and was met by defendant's counterclaim offering another will for probate. In the
replication the plaintiff was allowed to plead that the testatrix was of unsound mind at the
time the second will was executed, or that it had been revoked. The alternative evoked no
comment. In Hall v. Eve, 4 Ch. D. 341 (1876) the plaintiff in his replication fust denied
certain acts charged against him by the defendant in defendant's answer, and further stated
that if such acts were done, they were induced by the defendant who was estopped to rely
on them. Lord Justice James commented: "This case reminds me of a saying of the late
Mr. Jacob, that the importance of questions was in this ratio: First, costs; second, pleading;
and third, very far behind, the merits of the case."
93 Order 21, Rule 4.
94 Order 19, Rules 13, 17. ''Not guilty by statute" is an exception authorized by 0. 19,
R. 12 in a limited number of cases. ''The plea enables a defendant to raise all contentions of
law and prove all facts which may support his defense. Leave to plead additional defenses
must be obtained. It is usually safer to avoid the plea and to plead specially." AmmAL
PRACTICE 359 (1939). Under 0. 19, R. 18, either party may join issue upon the previous
pleading, which operates "as a denial of every material allegation of fact in the pleading upon
which issue is joined" except such as the party may be willing to admit.
95 In re Morgan, Owen v. Morgan, 35 Ch. D. 492 at 499-500 (1887).
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be defeated by any mere technicality, any slip, any mistaken step in
his litigation .... [L] aw has ceased to be a scientific game that may
be won or lost by playing some particular move." 96 But great progress
had been made and as observed recently by Viscount Simon, "[W]hile
admiring the subtlety of the old special pleaders, our Courts are primarily concerned to see that rules of law and procedure should serve
to secure justice between the parties." 97
In the intervening period, the center of interest in England, so
far as it involved the freedom to assert alternative contentions, was
upon the interrelated provisions for the joinder of parties and of
causes of action in the alternative. This is a fascinating story, and one
of which the courts of certain of our states have not always shown
themselves to be aware. Through a sequence of cases, extending over
a period of forty-four years, coupled with one amendment of the orders,
the English courts made the difficult transition from a formalistic attitude which rendered impossible a joinder of alternative and multiple
parties, to a free practice wherein such joinder is allowed provided
that there is a common question, factual or legal in nature, which the
court, in its discretion, judges it desirable to determine once and for
all as between all interested parties. But this is another story. 98 Suffice
it to say that today, in the English courts, formal restrictions upon
alternative positions are historical memories, and the parties are free
to assert their claims and their defenses upon the merits, assured that
investigation of the cause will not be impaired by rulings as to technical form. If a party loses upon a procedural blunder, it is unlikely
to be in the field of alternative pleading.
[To be concluded]
,
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310.
97 United Australia Ltd. v. Barclays Bank
98 The reader who is interested in tracing

Ltd., [1941] A. C. (H.L.) 1.
the evolution of the present liberal joinder of
parties in the alternative may do so in the following sequence of cases: Booth v. Briscoe, 2
Q.B.D. 496 (1877) (joinder of plaintiffs separately interested allowed); Smurthwaite v.
Hannay, [1894] A. C. (H.L.) 494 (joinder of plaintiffs separately interested held improper); Sadler v. Great Western R. Co., [1896] A. C. (H.L.) 450 (joinder of distinct
claims against separate defendants held improper); Carter v. Rigby & Co., [1896] 2 Q.B.
113 (joinder of plaintiffs separately interested held improper); Amendment to Order 16,
Rule l; Stroud v. Lawson, [1898] 2 Q.B. 44 (joinder of separate plaintiffs allowed when
claims grow out of same transaction); Walters v. Greene, [1899] 2 Ch. D. 696 (accord);
Drincgbier v. Wood, [1899] I Q.B. 840 (joinder of separate defendants on distinct alternative
theories for same damage denied); Frankenburg v. Great Horseless Carriage Co., [1900] 1
Q.B. 504 (separate theories against separate defendants allowed); Bullock v. London General
Omnibus Co., Ltd., [1907] 1 K.B. 264 (same); Compania Sansinena v. Boulder Bros. & Co.,
Ltd., [1910] 2 K.B. 354 (same); Payne v. British Time Recorder Co., Ltd., [1921] 2 K.B. 1
(same).

